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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-1012.5. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Does the failure of Petitioner Stephanie Boston (''Officer Boston5') to 
properly marshal the evidence supporting the Salt Lake City Civil Service 
Commission's ("CSC") factual findings preclude this Court from reviewing the 
issues presented in her Brief of Petitioner ("Boston Brief')? 
2. Did the CSC abuse its discretion or exceed its authority when it 
upheld Salt Lake City Police Department (USLCPD") Chief Chris Burbank's 
("Chief Burbank") termination of Officer Boston based upon the two incidents at 
issue viewed in light of the entirety of Officer Boston's employment history? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. When an Appellant fails to marshal the evidence supporting factual 
findings, the Court "must presume that the evidence presented was sufficient to 
support the [CSC's] findings . . ." Wayment v. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1151 
(Utah App. 2006). "When a party fails to marshal the evidence, [the Court] 
assume[s] the record supports the Commission's findings. [The Court has] shown 
no reluctance to affirm when the petitioner has failed to meet i1s marshaling 
burden." Whit ear v. Labor Comm '/?, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1998) see also 
Hiiemiller v. Ogden Civil Service Comm V?, 101 P.3d 394, 397 (Utah App. 2004). 
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2. The Court reviews the CSC's decision to determine if the decision 
''exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Ogden City Corp. v. 
Harmon, 116 P.3d 973, 976 (Utah App. 2005) quoting McKesson Corp. v. Labor 
Comm X 41 P.3d 468 (Utah App. 2002). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5: 
Any final action or order of the civil service commission may be appealed 
to the Court of Appeals for review. The notice of appeal must be filed 
within 30 days of the issuance of the final action or order of the civil 
service commission. The review by Court of Appeals shall be on the record 
of the civil service commission and shall be for the purpose of determining 
if the civil service commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Officer Boston has appealed the CSC's decision to uphold Chief Burbank's 
decision to terminate her employment. Respondent Salt Lake City Coiporation 
("City") presented the CSC sufficient evidence that Officer Boston had violated 
several City policies, that Officer Boston had an employment history containing 
numerous negative aspects, that several similarly situated officers were treated in a 
similar manner to Officer Boston, and that Officer Boston's repeated policy 
violations despite significant training and discipline indicated that additional 
progressive discipline would not be effective. 
Based upon the City's evidence and after considering Officer Boston's 
evidence and the positive aspects of her employment history, the CSC affirmed 
Chief Burbank's decision. The CSC was correct in determining that (1) the 
2 
charges warranted the sanction of termination (R. 35, TJ8);1 (2) the Department 
offered Officer Boston due process through the termination proceeding, (R. 35, 
}^9); (3) Chief Burbank's choice of discipline was not unduly excessive or clearly 
disproportionate to the offense (R. 35, If 10); and (4) Chief Burbank's choice of 
discipline did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality (R. 35, 
ni l ) . 
The Court should affirm the CSC's decision because Officer Boston failed 
to marshal the evidence supporting the CSC's factual findings, attacking those 
findings through conclusory statements and a selective presentation of certain facts 
that only support her position. Also, because the CSC's decision was within the 
bounds of its discretion, the Court should affirm the CSC's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 22, 2008, the CSC upheld Chief Burbank's July 7, 2007 
decision that Officer Boston violated SLCPD policies and that termination was the 
appropriate discipline for those violations in light of her entire employment 
history. Specifically, the CSC affirmed Chief Burbank's finding that Officer 
Boston's actions in the October 6, 2006 and the February 16, 2007 incidents 
warranted discipline. The CSC then affirmed Chief Burbank's conclusion that 
1
 The CSC's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 32-25) are fully 
set forth in and attached to the Brief of Appellant, Appendix 2. [Pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(b)(2), the City will rely on Officer Boston's 
Appendix and will not submit R. 32-25 again but wall simply refer to the record 
number throughout the City's Brief] 
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these two incidents, combined with Officer Boston's entire employment history, 
including prior discipline as well as the positive aspects of Officer Boston's 
employment history, warranted termination. In reaching its decision, the CSC 
received extensive testimony and documentary evidence relating to each of the 
two incidents and Officer Boston's entire employment history and heard testimony 
regarding other instances of discipline at SLCPD. 
Despite the substantial evidence supporting the CSC's findings, Officer 
Boston claims the CSC failed to properly consider the evidence. However, in 
order to attack the factual support for the CSC's decision, Officer Boston is 
required to marshal the evidence. This requires her "to marshal all the facts used 
to support the [CSC's] finding . . .." Wayment, 144 P.3d at 1150.2 Officer Boston 
has failed to meet this requirement. Given Officer Boston's failure, the City will 
properly marshal the facts supporting the CSC's decision. The Court should view 
these facts "in the light most favorable to the [City]." Id. A review of the 
properly marshaled facts demonstrates that there was ample evidence supporting 
the CSC's factual findings.3 
2
 The Court has consistently required appellants to marshal the evidence when 
attacking factual conclusions. The standard does not change based upon the body 
making the factual findings. See, e.g., Grace Drilling Company v. Board of 
Review of the Industrial Comm'/?, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). 
3
 The Record on Appeal consists of several multi-page volumes. Each volume was 
consecutively numbered as if it were a single document. Consequently, the City 
will cite to the specific page of a volume by referring to the Record number 
assigned to the specific volume and then cite to the individually numbered page 
within that volume. For example, the City's citation to (R. 31, p. 129) refers to 
page 129 of Record number 31, "Reporter's Transcript of Appeal Hearing." 
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II. OFFICER BOSTON'S HISTORY 
A. Written Reprimand 
In July 2005, Officer Boston received a written reprimand, her first 
discipline since being hired as a SLCPD police officer. (R. 31, p. 18; R. 18, pp. 
920-921). Officer Boston was the initial officer on an assault call. (R. 18, p. 917). 
During the investigation, information was developed that transitioned the case 
from a simple assault to a domestic violence investigation. Id. Officer Boston 
failed to follow SLCPD policy and arrest the predominant aggressor or both 
subjects in the case. (Id.; R. 31, p. 15). Officer Boston, the secondary officer on 
the scene and the 3-week recruit were advised that one of the subjects of the 
investigation had approximately $14,000.00 in outstanding warrants and they 
decided not to serve the warrants based on the fact that the subject had suffered a 
laceration on his hand that required medical treatment prior to being booked in 
jail. (R. 18, p. 917; R. 31, pp. 15-16). This decision was made without consulting 
a supervisor. (R.31, p. 16). 
Officer Boston received a Written Reprimand for violating two SLCPD 
policies: D30-04-00.00 "Officers Use of Discretion" and D65-02-00.00 
"Domestic Violence/Spouse Abuse Procedures, Section G." (R. 17, pp. 920-922; 
R. 31. p, 18). During her pre-disciplinary hearing with then Captain Terry Fritz, 
Officer Boston told him this was a "lesson learned." (R.31, p. 18). Officer Boston 
did not exercise her appeal rights with respect to that written reprimand although 
she could have done so. (R. 31, pp. 22 - 23; 303). 
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B. 40-hour Suspension: 
On August 2, 2005, Chief Charles F. "Rick" Dinse ("Chief Dinse") 
sustained three allegations of misconduct against Officer Boston based upon his 
conclusion that she had violated three SLCPD policies in three separate incidents 
that occurred in close proximity. (R. 18, pp. 669-672). The policies violated 
included D43-03-00.00 "Reports - Submitting Reports - Time Requirements," 
D45-02-00.00 "Maintaining the Chain of Evidence," and D43-02-00.00 "Reports -
Accuracy and Thoroughness Required." (R. 18, pp. 670-672). Officer Boston 
was aware of the policies she had violated. (R.31, pp. 38-39, 304; R. 18, pp. 781, 
802). Officer Boston stated during her pre-disciplinary hearing: "I have learned 
from all this. I mean, I do believe that since this happened my reports have been 
better. I write more reports on things that maybe I would have questioned before, 
documenting more stuff. This won't happen again." (R.31, p. 42; R. 18, p. 712). 
In her predisciplinary hearing, Officer Boston again told Captain Terry Fritz that 
when it comes to booking evidence and writing reports, this was a "lesson 
learned" in that she had made a mistake and had learned her lesson from that. (R. 
31, p. 40). 
For the sustained violations of SLCPD policies, Chief Dinse imposed a 40-
hour suspension without pay. (R. 18, pp. 669-672). In the letter of discipline, he 
wrote: "I sincerely hope that you understand the necessity of complying with 
department policies. Be advised that any future sustained complaints may result in 
discipline up to and including termination of your employment with Salt Lake City 
6 
Corporation." (R.31, p. 26; R. 18, p. 672). Officer Boston did not appeal her 
suspension although she could have nor did she claim that she had been treated 
unfairly. (R.31, pp. 304-305). 
C. 80-hour Suspension 
On October 25, 2005, Chief Dinse sustained two counts of misconduct 
against Officer Boston for neglect of duty (one count for failing 1o write a police 
report and one count for failing to book narcotic evidence) for an incident that 
occurred on May 20, 2005. (R. 17, pp. 369-372). There, Officer Boston was 
dispatched to a reckless driver call. Upon her arrival, she contacted a 15 year old 
juvenile that showed visible signs of impairment and had possession of drug 
paraphernalia and a small amount of marijuana in a baggie. (R. 31, p. 50). Officer 
Boston detained the juvenile and transported him to a location where she released 
him to his mother. Id. After concluding the contact with the juvenile's mother and 
the juvenile, Officer Boston destroyed the marijuana pipe by breaking it and 
throwing it in the trash without writing a police report on the incident. (R. 17, p. 
369; R. 31, p. 52). Officer Boston contended that she had written a log report, 
although that was inappropriate under the circumstances. (R.31, pp. 52-54). 
During her predisciplinary hearing, Officer Boston admitted she had made 
an error, stating: "With regard to this particular call 1 made a bad decision, a poor 
judgment call. At the time 1 believed the log report was the right decision. The 
situation was resolved without any arrests and I believed there would not be any 
further problems. I believe documenting the action taken in a log report was 
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adequate. . . Today, looking back at the situation, I know better than that and 
would definitely have done things differently. Unfortunately, 1 can't go back, I 
can only leam from the mistake and move forward." (R.31, p.; R. 17, p. 416). She 
also stated that if she had it to do over again, she "most certainly would have 
booked the pipe into evidence and written a short report documenting my actions. 
...It violated policy and I accept responsibility for that." (R. 31, pp. 59-60; R. 17, 
p. 417). 
Captain Fritz had felt that Officer Boston had been untruthful during her 
interviews about the incident and had recommended to Chief Dinse that he also 
sustain a violation of the "Truthfulness" policy. (R.31, p. 61). Chief Dinse chose 
to give Officer Boston the benefit of the doubt on the truthfulness allegation and 
did not sustain that. (R.31, p. 62). 
Chief Dinse imposed an 80-hour suspension without pay for the violations 
of SLCPD policies D43-04-00.00 "Reports - Situations Requiring a Report" and 
D45-09-00.00 "Narcotics Placed in Evidence." Again, Chief Dinse warned 
Officer Boston that "[a]ny further sustained findings of misconduct may result in 
the further imposition of discipline, up to and including termination." (R. 17, p. 
371). Officer Boston did not appeal the suspension although she could have nor 
did she complain that she was treated unfairly. (R.31, p. 304). 
III. INCIDENTS PRECIPITATING TERMINATION 
A. The Collision/DUI Incident 
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It is interesting to note that although the incident that occurred in October 
2006 was referred to throughout the CSC hearing as a DUI case (driving under the 
influence), in Boston's Brief, she has chosen to refer to this as the "collision 
incident." In an effort to link Officer Boston's new reference to the reference used 
in the hearing documents and hearing transcript, the City will refer to this incident 
as the "collision/DUl incident." 
On October 6, 2006, Officer Boston was dispatched to a "Hit and Run Just 
Occurred" call. (R.31, p. 104). Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Boston and 
Officer Stutz, a very junior officer, found the vehicle and then contacted the 
suspect at his residence. (R.31, p. 104). The suspect indicated to the officers that 
he had been drinking at a bar and had crashed his car. Office Stutz testified during 
his Internal Affairs (IA) interview that the suspect showed signs of intoxication. 
(R.31, p. 104). The complainant who witnessed the hit and run had very specific 
information that placed the male suspect behind the wheel of the car and indicated 
that the suspect was intoxicated at the time. (R.31, p. 106). Officer Boston, 
however, never made any attempt to contact the complainant. (R.31, p. 106). 
Officer Boston was the scene commander but did not take control of the situation. 
(R.31, p. 114). No field sobriety tests were conducted. (R.31, p. 106). The 
investigation was incomplete and inaccurate. (R.31 at 108). A citation was 
ultimately issued to the male suspect but it was not for DUI. (R.31, p. 107). The 
citation inaccurately quoted the City ordinance. (R.31, p. 112). Officer Boston 
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failed to contact a supemsor and instead relied on the junior officer "freshly out of 
the academy" to make a DU1 determination. (R.31, p. 114). 
B. The Theft Incident 
While the collision/DUI case was pending, another case alleging 
misconduct by Officer Boston was filed arising out of a theft call to which Officer 
Boston was dispatched. (R. 31, p. 123). A citizen had complained that his vehicle 
had been burglarized and that some tools were taken from the vehicle. (R.31, p. 
115). The victim believed that an individual in the apartment complex had taken 
the tools and wanted Officer Boston to contact this person. R. 31, p. 115). Officer 
Boston did not do that. (R.31, p. 298). She left the scene without writing a police 
report. (R.31, pp. 115). She used a log report to state that a theft had occurred. 
(R.31, p. 115-116). The victim contacted the Department the next day and another 
officer was sent to the scene and investigated the matter. That officer wrote a 
detailed report identifying the suspect and the tools that were taken. (R.3, p. 117). 
This allowed an investigation to occur and the suspect was arrested in a relatively 
short period of time. (R.31, p. 118). 
IV. THE TERMINATION DECISION 
Given the fact that Chief Burbank viewed the collision/DUI case and the 
theft case as "very serious" because they "went right to our departmental integrity 
and our organization's ability to take care of business and retain public trust," 
combined with Officer Boston's history, Chief Burbank felt he could not allow 
Officer Boston to continue to work and, as a result, Officer Boston was placed on 
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paid administrative leave while the 1A investigations were pending. (R.31, p. 
123). 
Chief Burbank sustained the allegations of misconduct in the collision/DUI 
incident because Officer Boston's conduct violated SLCPD policy D20-04-00.00 
"Improper Use of Discretion and Failure to Take Proper Police Action." (R. 17, p. 
204). Chief Burbank sustained the allegations of misconduct in the theft incident 
because Officer Boston's neglect of duty violated SLCPD policies D43-04-00.00 
"Reports - Situations Requiring a Report" and D44-04-02.00 "Call Classification 
Criteria". (R. 17, pp. 226-207). 
Prior to making his final disciplinary decision, Chief Burbank met with the 
captain and the assistant chief who presented both cases to him and went through 
the circumstances surrounding both incidents. (R. 31, p. 127). Chief Burbank 
then reviewed both the underlying IA investigation files, Officer Boston's 
responses in her IA interviews, the information she provided in her predisciphnary 
hearing, her personnel history and information contained in her employment file. 
(R. 3-4). Chief Burbank also granted Officer Boston's request to come and meet 
with him and again present her side of the story. (R.31, pp. 127-128). She 
admitted to Chief Burbank that she had made some mistakes in the two cases 
4
 Chief Burbank's letter of termination (R. 1-5) is fully set forth in and attached to 
the Brief of Appellant, Appendix 1. [Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 24(b)(2), the City will rely on Officer Boston's appendix and will 
not submit R. 1-5 again but will simply refer to the record number throughout the 
City's Brief] 
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(R.31, p. 128). When making his decision, Chief Burbank could not "outweigh 
the good conduct with the problems that we had identified that had been 
continually repeated." (R.31, p. 141). The Chief believed that Officer Boston had 
been "afforded ample opportunity to change her behavior and did not do so." 
(R.31, p. 144.). Chief Burbank stated, "Despite considerable training and 
progressive discipline, you have shown a recurring lack of acceptable 
performance, poor judgment, an inability to consistently perform basic 
fundamental duties of a police officer and conform to Department policy." (R. 4). 
Chief Burbank also knew Chief Dinse had warned Officer Boston that further 
sustained complaints could lead to termination. (R. 4). Chief Burbank terminated 
Officer Boston's employment on July 9, 2007, stating: "I have lost all trust and 
confidence in your ability to meet the many demands that are placed on a police 
officer." (R. 4). 
V, PROPORTIONALITY 
The CSC found that Chief Burbank's termination of Officer Boston was not 
unduly excessive or clearly disproportionate to the offense. (R. 35, T|10). The CSC 
heard testimony and received evidence on Officer Boston's background, 
employment history, similar prior incidents, and prior progressive discipline. The 
CSC made several findings relating to the matter of proportionality: 1) that Officer 
Boston's overall service record was exemplary in many respects (R. 33, ^ J 5); (2) 
that Officer Boston was an excellent officer in many performance areas and at 
various times during her employment (R. 33, ^ [ 6); (3) that Officer Boston's 
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employee evaluations were universally excellent (R. 33, ^ | 7); (4) that Officer 
Boston received three disciplinary actions over a relatively short period of time (R. 
33, ^ 10); (5) that by the time the two incidents occurred which precipitated 
Boston's termination, she had been properly warned and was on notice that any 
further misconduct on her part may result in termination (R. 34, f|| 12); (6) that the 
series of violations were similar in nature and progressive discipline had been 
ineffective (R. 34, j^ 13); and (7) that although Officer Boston did not willfully 
violate Department policy, her actions evidenced a persistent lack of judgment 
which caused the Department's management to lose trust in her as a police officer 
(R. 34,114). 
Officer Boston's personnel record includes many letters of commendation 
for her service as a Police Officer and her performance evaluations contain many 
"meets standards" or "exceeds standards" ratings. (See, Boston Brief, Appendix 
3). Chief Burbank considered Officer Boston's commendatory service as a police 
officer. (R. 31, pp. 128-129, 140). 
In addition to these positive aspects of Officer Boston's career, the CSC 
considered the negative aspects of her career. The CSC received evidence 
concerning her three prior formal disciplinary matters and also received evidence 
that Officer Boston's supervisors had informally counseled or warned her 
regarding various SLCPD policies. (R.31,pp. 130-131). One of her sergeants 
testified that Officer Boston "took shortcuts" (R.31, p. 236) and told her to make 
sure "all your I's are dotted and your T's are crossed." (R.31, pp. 232, 238). 
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In his July 9, 2007 decision, Chief Burbank stated that he had "lost all trust 
and confidence in [Boston's] ability to meet the many demands placed on a police 
officer." (R. 4). Notwithstanding Officer Boston's considerable and lengthy 
positive employment record, Chief Burbank concluded that Officer Boston's 
termination was appropriate, in part, due to: the two incidents of misconduct (R. 
4); the close proximity of two incidents; (R. 31, p. 140); the similarity between her 
prior misconduct that resulted in formal discipline and the two incidents (R. 31, 
pp. 140, 144; R. 4); the adverse affect of Officer Boston's actions on the public 
confidence in the SLCPD (R. 31, p. 129-130, 134, 139); the adverse affect of 
Officer Boston's actions on the morale and effectiveness of SLCPD employees (R. 
31, p. 145); Chief Burbank's conclusion that Officer Boston was on sufficient 
notice that her actions were unacceptable (R. 4; R.31, 130-131, 143-144); the 
sufficient intervention and time for Officer Boston to correct her conduct (R. 31, 
pp. 130-131, 143-144); Chief Burbank's opinion that Officer Boston could not 
consistently perform the basic functions of a police officer and that the trend 
would only continue (R. 4; R. 31, p. 143); Officer Boston's failure to learn from 
her prior mistakes despite her repeated promises to do so (R.31, pp. 129-130); and 
Chief Burbank's opinion that further discipline would not change Officer Boston's 
conduct. (R, 4; R.31, p. 143). Further, the City presented many examples of 




The CSC reviewed Officer Boston's case against the evidence presented 
regarding other police officers that had received discipline from Chief Burbank. 
The CSC found there were several other similarly situated officers who were 
treated in a similar manner to Officer Boston (R. 33, *\\ 4). Chief Burbank testified 
of various individuals who he had disciplined during his tenure as Chief of Police. 
(R.31,pp. 146-150): 
a. A sergeant who had no other complaints received $20.00 that was 
found property but did not book that $20.00 into evidence. Because of this, Chief 
Burbank "couldn't keep him as an employee." (R.31, p. 146). 
b. An officer who had been with the Department for 16 years had a 
"similar stoiy of circumstances where he was not documenting his police actions." 
(R.31, p. 147). Although he did "some outstanding work" and the Chief "really 
hated to lose" him, "when it came down to it, he did not document accurately 
domestic violence incidents, didn't file the proper paperwork associated with that, 
and he really put the public at risk." (R.31, p. 147). 
c. Chief Burbank made the decision to terminate both of the above 
individuals but both resigned in lieu of termination. (R.31, pp. 147-148). 
d. Chief Burbank testified of a sergeant who, on a DUI call, chose to 
destroy evidence and not process the person for DUI. (R.31, p. 148). The 
sergeant had no prior disciplinary history but Chief Burbank imposed a 60-hour 
suspension without pay for this first sustained misconduct. (R.31 at 149-150). 
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/\ Jl"s> • • •! . iwiiiui .: ins sergeant dose proximity and Chief 
Burbank placed him on administrate !• - ; ^ i .• -vi^M.t 
resigned while tlutt investigation was pending. i\< :•!. p. i iu j . 
e. ' "uiMvaoner i,>itinUiiiii aAcd ('hief Burbank: "S<> \ou"\ c lost 
some fair! v eood officers and --.-r.-.- >.;••!-•--i ; W M , ••.. .•;:.:...;
 : ; = : 
which Cliief Burbank responded, "Yeah. And \io unfuiiunate. But I thii ik foi 
again, me Jepartmeniai integrity that it's essential." (R ?1. p. 140j. 
•, ' M M \ I \ I O r .Ai\< A .'N i l j N t 
The CSC's decision to affirm Chief Burbank's eh *'•.••• ; "• -ciplinc must be 
.,;; n med u "dess that decision "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
•'
 :
 .•'"" . ;^i-.i iirse the CSC "must ci\e 
deference to the chief s choice of pmn le- • • : 
entitled to impose the discipline of hi- choice a^  long a^  the underlvii-m tdcia 
• ppoii in • .-e* i--- • impose eii.>v ;phnc and mat discipline is consistent with 
discipline he has previously imposed because lie "MUM h o c the ability to manage 
and direct I is officers, and r* ; ; die best position to know whether ihei" i- * : 
e . . . S./.7 /../MJ City Civil Service Conan '//., S P 3d lo-*.\ 
1054 (btali App. 200* >-• ' HIII lpioeeed|-, .\.u:i-..ady, so as not to 
undermine ibe Chief s auihuiitj . . ..' HuLiiiilLr, iwi i .eu ^ e%. 
Belore me Coiirt ^vm reaches the application of fhese legal standards, it 
should dispose •M'f.^f'eu !>"M'^'- • -• liemic'1'- me 'aekee bases Mr her 
termination. Officer Boston's entire brief is ba^ed up^e T!. • * *r m -.vi- :i-sinnplioii 
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that the CSC improperly determined the evidence when it made its factual 
findings. However, Officer Boston's failure to properly marshal the evidence 
supporting the CSC's factual findings requires the Court to assume the evidence 
supports those factual findings. Moreover, even if the Court re-examines the 
evidence presented to the CSC, the City has demonstrated that the CSC heard and 
received more than enough credible evidence to support its factual findings. 
Chief Burbank's termination decision properly considered the severity of 
the two incidents, Officer Boston's entire employment history, and the discipline 
he had imposed on other employees. Based upon the evidence presented, the CSC 
properly upheld Chief Burbank's decision to terminate Officer Boston. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OFFICER BOSTON FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE CSC'S DECISION 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "a 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." This has been defined as a "critical requirement 
of appellate advocacy." Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App. 12 If 24, 973 P.2d 431, 
437. This Court has described the marshaling process: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's 
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
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supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
»/. •*.'.. ! . , : ' - } quuhng West Valley City v. Majestic Inv Co . 81b I3.2d 
131 1, 13 15 (blah AM ' •
 tj.-i-- : - ..MI an appeiiMn fOs fr IM -1 
the "hca\ \ hunleif of mar,haling the evidence, the couii ;!^m>"'' M • ;! '• • -
: MIL-. .-.wer court's findings. Id. 
1
 ' i . . 7 <^  i '.i.':* -N ;r ..-,. .... :l«iicriL.iiig .liLM'jciual basi.s for a f;t'.*{ 
finder's conclusions to marshal a!! the eviden-. • *• •'•< " M \\-.w . * . 3M. - ••. I s e 
I Jtah Supreme Court, has held that: 
This duty requires an appellant to marshal ud of the facts used to support 
the trial court's findings and then show that these facts cannot possibly 
siipport the conclusion reached by the trial court, eyen when vit wed in the 
Ugh: most favorahlc to the appellee. An appellant may not simply cite to 
the evidence which supports his or her position and hope to rn--\ •;/' 
•
]
 . - . i • • MI ,'iuirds added); Scharfv BMG Corporation, 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah Ws- • • ^ am Mils to so marshal the 
evidence, we assume that ;:!l findings are adeqiu-eh u p - ' v d h * •'' -i e-• i 
\ •. i-: -;-v (MiSiOM .;i. . ..,hiMM *o !he suffieienv\ of die c\ idencc/* (jrayv. 
Oxford Worldwide (// ' >'„ uu. • pp. 3of>M. 
Surprisingly, Officer Boston challenges the imdiniM ••' ' • 
wa.s it-» niiiu' ..i! iaeiua! dispute between the parties regarding the underlying facts" 
and that "Bo-M>n CS^M ' :--- matcrim KiMs related to the charges." 
(R. 33, ^] 1 -1), Officer Boston claims that tliese findings constrti ite "'clear error" ' 
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despite the fact that on two occasions, her counsel admitted to the CSC that 
Officer Boston was not challenging the underlying facts. At the prehearing 
conference, Officer Boston's counsel contended that Officer Boston was arguing 
that she had been denied her due process rights but was not challenging the 
underlying incidents. At the beginning of the CSC hearing, Commissioner Jack 
Quintana verified this in the following exchange: 
COMMISSIONER QUINTANA: . . . Greg [Skordas], let me see if I 
understand your comments at our prehearing. It is your contention that the 
due process was the challenge here, correct? 
GREG SKORDAS: Right. 
COMMISSIONER QUINTANA: I take it Greg, you're not contending that 
any of these things did or did not happen. 
GREG SKORDAS: Well, that's true. We're going to talk about them and 
how-
COMMISSIONER QUINTANA: I understand that, relative to the 
seriousness, et cetera. 
GREG SKORDAS: Right. 
(R.31, pp. 5-6). Officer Boston's counsel likewise did not challenge any of the 
exhibits, which included the IA cases and her disciplinary history, from being 
admitted at the onset of the hearing. (R.31, p. 6). It was entirely reasonable for 
the CSC to take Officer Boston's counsel at his word and determine from the 
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beuimn. l -i : " • \ f u u i s p u i e s c o n c e r n i n g the u n d e r l y i n g facts and 
thai Off icer B o s t o n essent ia l ly a d m i t t e d the n\i\u A .». - r.-h-i, •; • • •. a^;-, 
\a\\\ however, it appears that Officer Boston warns lo challenge ihe undeilvnvj 
i;u K. de-"'"c ih -;•.•"' : - • \ .-.: IKJUI UK. prehearing conference and the CSC 
hearing itself. 
Even assuming such a change of position should be allowed, Officer 
Bosi'M • .•_ . i . =. iiuh \ :«.iiden i>f marshaling the e\ idence. "•• • 
demonstrated below, rathei •• ••••.•—. .-... i •. ./...••».• •: fiLcr Bos ton 
has p r e s e n t e d the facts that suppor t he r v e r s i o n of the c a s e , i u n u :•.!•.••-:•• 
evidence si lpporting uiv. ( Si '\s factual findings 01 argued thai ihe CSC failed to 
consider the evident . ••• -•- ^ •" *• h^f; . ..-uc-. (,.: >_n O n c e r Boston's 
failure to present the tacts which support the CSC's deci-i. *!i -1 * 
lciuse to consider the arguments set foi th in the Boston Brief and affirm the CSC's 
factual findi! igs. 
A review of Officer Boston's Brief irxnils that sin fuleil tu dmnlder the 
burden of huushaling the evidence. Rather, she sharks hci diU) untirch. ,j: ' , . 
the v id. n. • ^i'/ u. ' ] and asserting, m c h:n-t four f V\ places m hei 
Brief that the City presented no evidenc- t-*-i • - • "'• - ^ (See, 
e.g. Boston Brief, pp. 22-25). Simply because Officer Boston chose to ignoic llie 
evidt nee pic .ented h; ihr i \i\ ihiough numerous witnesses and exhibits does not 
mean that competent evidence w:^ f i-' "mod1. •.•:.!. :*•• i Boston !:as chosen to 
focus on the facts most favorable to her position and ^mpi\ learguc h.-i • :•• > Hs 
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Court should decline to consider Officer Boston's challenge to the Commission's 
findings and decision because of Officer Boston's complete failure to marshal the 
evidence. See, e.g. Whhear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 
1998) (the Court of Appeals has shown no reluctance to affirm when the petitioner 
has failed to meet its marshaling burden). 
II. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS WERE SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. The substantial evidence standard. 
It has been determined that the Commission's findings, upon which charges 
are based, must be supported by substantial evidence. Lucas v. Murray City Civil 
Service Commission, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah App. 1997). Substantial evidence 
has been defined as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id. Substantial 
evidence is more than a mere "scintilla of evidence and something less than the 
weight of the evidence." Id. The appellate court docs not review the 
Commission's findings de novo or reweigh the evidence. Id. Findings based upon 
substantial evidence will not be overturned "even if another conclusion from the 
evidence is permissible." Whitear, 973 P.2d at 984, quoting, Hurley v. Bd. of Rev. 
of Indus. Comm '/?, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). 
B. The facts supported the charges made by the Department and the facts 
supported the discipline. 
1. The coIIision/DUI incident 
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Oih.'iM MM-: • • * .-. • .. :ii,u • m,i liui hank offered no 
"specifics" as to how Officer Boston violated l-^A ' * olhsiond ){ d case, 
:• .i'uvi, she contends that Chief Rmbank testified "ad lib"" about the generic 
; : : - w ^ ( 'i : ; \ • \ lew -! ihc "specifics" 
provided b) Chief Burbank reveals that tin vi • • • ••. ^ •: - b*.:o: • .n _-\. cmee to 
show that the facts in the collision/DI II case supported the charges made :-\ die 
Dcpartme: ..:•-.; : •.. - .ppo/ki: .nc discipline imposed. That evidence, which 
Officer Boston failed to set •'•- ••>• ^ •. . 1 -
a. There was some conversation about whether or no? ' •••- ' 0 •. *!-e 
ase • ^ acn....., -iiicing and whether he was intoxicated. (R.31, p. IJ 'OJ; 
b. The . v i ; - "• •. =.L-..ccident gave very detailed 
information concerning the description of the drivei -o !•• •• f!- •••* • 
!• :i lie nia.K. A jb ihc di J\ cr of the car and that he was possibly intoxicated, [li.j 1, 
p p . iU(>- i s '••• •; 
c. Officer Boston did not contact :1 : -
d. There were indications at tlic time that the suspect was intoxicated 
e. • No field sobriety tests weie c-- ;.! 
f An incomplete and investigation was conducted. (R.31,p. 108. . 
g. 1 heir wr. no «j uc -turn \\\\\\ ihc situation warranted a fin die1 
investigation. (R.31, p. 110). 
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h. The steps that should have been taken include (1) conducting some 
sort of field sobriety test, (2) asking questions of the suspect and witnesses, (3) 
building the case, and (4) taking the person for an intoxilyzer test. (R.31, pp. 110-
111). 
i. Officer Boston was the scene commander and relied on a very junioi 
officer to make a DUI determination. (R.31, p. 114). 
j . Officer Boston had been admonished before on other occasions that 
if she had questions on how to handle things she should contact a supervisor but 
she chose not to do that. (R.31, p. 114). 
k. Officer Boston failed to perform the basic fundamental duties of a 
police officer on this call. (R. 1). 
1. Officer Boston failed to properly handle the call. (R. 1). -
m. Officer Boston testified that she was trained to do DUIs. (R.31, p. 
267). 
n. She was trained to recognize the signs of intoxication and to 
administer field sobriety tests. (R.31, p. 267). 
o. Officer Boston has performed field sobriety tests on people when 
she was employed wilh the County and also as a Salt Lake City police officer. 
(R.31, pp. 268-269). 
p. Officer Boston was certified to administer the intoxilyzer test. 
(R.31, p. 269). 
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Officer Boston nuil-es ," U»ld asseiiion dial die i S( never addressed what 
she calls an evidentiary conflict based upon some discivr •.•.. •* ] fw «• M. I »» ^ . 
noston's position thai die suspect showed litile sign of actual intoxication or 
inlpainiK ;- • ; ;*•'••••! M'a/ - -a.it. : . • nuuie during die Internal Affairs 
investigation that suggested greater manifestation .»l .••'••• • mon Because of tllis 
perceived conflict, Officer Boston concrudes "Chief Burbank's apparent decision 
.
 !
 - = - ' - i-*'.\«" -••• »--'n^er Boston cannot justify his decision to 
discipline Officer Boston." (Boston Bnm «* ? •- ... ..-n •:-contrary 
to the law which vesls in the chief o 'police the discrelion to impose diM 
and, more inipoiianil y, u ignores the rest of the substantial evidence that was 
presented that reflects m a ( 'h . : ; ' * :^ v\_ .• m -de. a a aivat man\ ;lungs prior to 
making his decision to terminate Officer Boston's emHo\ mom 
Oin eer Boston also apparently believes that because Officer Boston's and 
Officer Stui/A •>*•. .^ - • i *'• •
 uk. a .a mnes differ, that the 
CSC's finding that "there were no material factual ;> - j * * - - : • •;
 ; • -. c-. 
regarding i;.». ir.ulci lying facts" cannot stand mi si. Officer Boston failed to 
properlv n ''-l - •• .
 : m.wing. Second, the CSC, not this 
Cou''i. must weigh the credibility of the witness* :s ai id the cvidci ice presented. 
]• mm\. \\\ - ;her or not Officer Boston stated th.it the suspect showed liuie 
5
 Although Officer Boston's counsel could ha\e cross-examined Chief Burbank oi\ 
this very issue at the CSC hearing, he did not. nor did he ever ask Chief Burbank 
anything about Officer Stiitz, instead bringing this idea up for the first time in tin-. 
appeal. 
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impairment and Officer Stutz stated that the suspect was visibly intoxicated does 
not create a material fact. 
The CSC was in the best position to consider all of the testimony presented 
related to this incident and reach the factual conclusions it did. It heard the 
testimony, reviewed the evidence and made the credibility determinations 
necessary to reach its factual conclusions. This Court has held that: 
We note that trial courts are accorded wide latitude in determining factual 
matters. They are in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses 
and to gain a sense of the proceeding as a whole. Where contradictory 
evidence is offered— the fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting 
evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions. 
State, ex rel Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Six Mile Ranch Company, 
132 P.3d 687, 694 (Utah App. 2006). Further: 
[T]his Court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably 
conflicting views, even though we may have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before us for de novo review. It is the province of the 
[CSC], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the 
[CSC] to draw the inferences. 
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. 
Officer Boston's and Officer Stutz's observations were simply two pieces 
of evidence that were before the CSC. To suggest that this discrepancy is 
sufficient to outweigh the remaining evidence that was presented concerning the 
collision/DUI incident and constitutes clear error on the part of the CSC to 
determine that the facts support discipline is simply not plausible. 
2. The theft incident 
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OHuvi Boston cnnieikf dial the facts do not support the discipline imposed 
regarding the theft incident because she gencrar- ' • ";. • -cp>!i ^ c a\ 
COL id noi :iave violated tlie SIXTH policy i)4 V04 00.00 "Reports - Situations 
<: s imh ^--M(- ! ;, t iiu^iun lails to marshal the c\ idence. She 
makes the argument dial il is MIUJ ..* c - -; .'':• . -,,• c : \ i ^ u a. .e ineil 
incident because of die "\ aguclv w riucn""1 report policy.' A review of *C \ r • 
iMrsenieJ • •• v \ e..; m a UK I ->t nad .substantial evidence to conclude that the 
facts supported the discipline llnf «'\ idence "\hkh ( Ml'ieer Bosu-i. nuk-- tr-
marshal, includes: 
.'. a. • Of iicer Boston had been disciplined before for using a log report 
instead of writing a general offense repoi t SI le received an 80-hour suspension 
without pax tor \lolaung the same SLCPD pohc\ : 4^-C-i • •• > ' " .: ,n , : t 
s:ic ,v »&a'u • •• MJCY a n d m a d e a b a d d e c i s i o n . ( R . 3 1 ; pp. f V-60; R. , >\ pp. -t \ 0-
418). 
b. The policy specifically ^ictc^ ^ f 'V .• ui.-o-. p-:ice action or a 
c. siiie has been enmnnn- : •• \\\ die case of a theft under $1,000 where thei- -
susn. .'i •;>?. • :i genei. I ollense report is required. (R.31 >> <o, 
A lot' nan HI did not in the specif* - *-* ..icii because 
there was suspect mformafion and a crime had been committed. (R.3 1, 
J
 Although Officer Boston"^ aumscl could have cross-examined Chief Burbank t»^  
this very issue at the CSC hearing, he dui nun instead bringing liiis idea up for the 
first time in this appeal. 
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d. Any time an officer takes police action, he or she writes a report 
detailing what action was taken, including a little narrative telling the story of 
what took place. (R.31, p. 52). 
e. There were numerous times when sergeants had taken Officer 
Boston aside and addressed issues such as writing a police report. (R.31, p. 130). 
Even if the Court were to assume that Officer Boston adequately marshaled 
the evidence, the Court should still affirm the CSC's factual findings because 
Officer Boston has not demonstrated "that this evidence is 'legally insufficient to 
support the finding[s] even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below.'" Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 561 (Utah App. 2003) quotingProMax 
Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997). Officer Boston has 
simply failed to adequately present any reason why this Court should disregard the 
CSC's factual findings and the Court should assume they are correct. This Court 
has repeatedly held that a party cannot "simply present the evidence supporting 
[her] position at trial and reargue its weight. That approach misapprehends the 
role of this court." Six Mile Ranch Company, 132 P.3d at 693-94. Again, the 
Court need not consider Officer Boston's argument given her failure to properly 
marshal the facts supporting the CSC's factual findings. Wayment, 144 P.3d at 
1150. 
Officer Boston's failure to properly marshal the evidence supporting the 
CSC's factual findings is fatal to her claim that the facts do not support the CSC's 
conclusions. 
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III i in< t s r N«>IM:KL\ IAKRCISKD ITS MS< "RKTION WIFF.N IT 
UPHELD OFFK'FR BOSTON'S I FKMIN VI ION 
Utah Code Ann ; 10-^-1 \\/ ^ 1 units this Lourfs reuew oftheCSC's 
decision "to the record •.: i:ie [> on-Mi-Muii" \r- determine "if the Commission has 
abused its discretion or i-'-vv/.V.- • .•' .
 : ^ : j ihat it "mi ist 
uphold the Commission's determination . . . «nicbi the determination exceeds (lie 
bonndb oi reasonableness and rationality," McKesson Corn , 4 1 P.3d 4o>, Thc 
CS< -K'K '• ' •• : -\*. . r s j i : ;
 iK)\\ me qu^Tions m the affirmative: 
"1 ) do die facts support the charges made by the depart n *a hi->.: .-• 
the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" Kelly. 8 I\3d at 1052. 1 unhu', the 
• d * • - : . ' . au iw Jjicrence to uie Liuci > Jioice of punishment." 
Harmon, 1 ,o P.3d at 977. 
Rather than address the relevant law and the facts supporting her own 
r.'-^o;-
 {] r,( ; -,; ,\ o.;!., i,,iv e i he ( \»urt r^dev\ . dc novo, each of the 
alleged incidents, accept 1 ler exci ises foi her miscoi idi ict, igi lore the totality oflier 
misconduct, focus solely on the positive aspects oflier career, and Md^.on .*..£ 
Coint's '\-:i :nc;ii . fan appropriate discipline for that of Chief Burhunk's. Nnrh 
an approach 'Liiorc^ iho hh i - ;i: .\iM . •* -. • . . .MIK. Moci.mi 
substantial , •. idence supporting the CSC's factual findings OUIIPM ' • ' • • . 
C M' acted with reason and rationality when it determined thai -he facts supported 
Chief Burbank's tot ii * • . . m hcio\w me I S( also acted 
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within its discretion when it determined that Officer Boston's misconduct 
warranted the sanction of termination. 
A. The CSC Properly Applied the Law. 
The CSC properly held that the facts supported the charges made by the 
Department and that the sanction of termination was appropriate. (R. 34, ^ 1-2). 
To reach this determination, it necessarily examined two questions: 1) is the 
sanction of termination proportionate to the insubordination and other charges 
against Officer Boston, and 2) whether the sanction of termination is consistent 
with similar discipline imposed by Chief Burbank on other SLCPD employees. 
This is the process set forth in Utah law. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 
818 P.2d 23, 32 (Utah App. 1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil 
Service Comm 'n, 908 P.2d 871, 876-77 (Utah App. 1995); Harmon, 116 P.3d at 
977, 
B. The Discipline Was Proportionate 
While this Court has not adopted one standard which the CSC must use in 
making these determinations, it has pointed to several factors which other courts 
have used to determine the "proportionality of the punishment to the offense." 
Harmon, 116 P.3d at 978. The Court has also noted that a "series of violations 
accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline may support 
termination." Id. The factors this Court sees as useful are: 
(a) whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties 
and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry out those duties; (b) 
whether the offense was of a type that adversely affects the public 
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confidence in the department; (c) whether the offense undermines the 
morale and effectiveness of the department; or (d) vvhether the offense was 
committed u ilitulK or knowingly, rather than negligently or inud\ertentlv. 
!
 'oLiris ha\c I'urihci considered whether the misconduct is likeK M 
reoccur. 
Here, the CSC examined ili'.-. ':«i* i!^'«• - ! *r- • :• rhe.: .: e -acr. s-s 
outlined h\ this Omit in //o//,'/o// and concluded that the sanction oi icru !•;;:•••• 
- a> uppo • -.Uv. . Vi'^ • - — die Harmon factors to the CSC's decision an eals that 
Officer Boston's miscoiuiik I impaefrd each of the laelors. 
1. Harmon factor (a): "Whether the violation is direetl) related to the 
employee's official duties and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry 
out those duties 
Ofli'vr R< -^»M~ a - \ \ . \ *•. . .iLieimmai'.on \\\,u 'j fine violations of 
policy which resulted in Boston's termination '.a * •>• - r< \ - ,. ie> 
and vsgmln jntly impeded her ability to carry uui those duties." 'VR. 34. \ 4 ; , ^m-
suggest < • ' •: .. .i- -ncJ more than n bare recitation i>fii-.L 
consideration itself." ^Boston Bra *'n ^ - i I • •• m'tu
 [S spunous since it is 
undisputed 4 at in hnth die o*HMuu I )l 1 incident and the die It incident, Officer 
B*^1 ' • • =. \-i: - ait) p« sliu; DI liccr responding In uills for service a nil 
in bodi lnciuuils otner on-dui\ s l a '••'•*->a. .•,.•.c a;so present fR^I r 
144), Then r ' 'ie. Officer Boston's misconduct obviously related dir •• •' 
official duties. 
Officer Boston states t ~vsi <t< • ^  • , •• a> ai\ en i \ die CSC as to how 
Officer Boston's alleged policy violations impeded her ;•' 1 - • *• o ' - :- -
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duties because "no such explanation can be imagined, much less supported." 
(Boston Brief p. 22). Again, Officer Boston simply ignores the evidence that was 
presented to the CSC that shows that her ability to perform her duties was 
significantly impeded: 
a. The collision/DUI and the theft incidents were "very serious" and 
went "right to [the] departmental integrity and [the] organization's ability to take 
care of business and retain public trust." (R.31, p. 123) 
b. Because of the serious nature of the two incidents and Officer 
Boston's history, Chief Burbank could not allow Officer Boston to continue to 
work "on the chance that there may be other case [sic] out there that she would 
become involved in and mishandle" so he placed her on paid administrative leave 
pending the outcome of the IA investigations. (R.31, p. 123). 
c. Chief Burbank determined that Officer Boston had shown "a 
recurring lack of acceptable performance, poor judgment, an inability to 
consistently perform basic fundamental duties and conform to department 
policies." (R. 4). 
d. The collision/DUI and theft incidents, when coupled with Officer 
Boston's prior history "reflected a pattern of continued inability to perform the 
basic functions of a police officer." (Id.) 
The CSC had ample evidence to conclude as it did that "[t]he violations of 
policy which resulted in Boston's termination related directly to her official duties 
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and significantly impeded her ability to carry out those duties." (R. 34, f^ 4). The 
first Harmon factor was satisfied. 
2. Harmon factor (b): whether the offense was of a type that adversely 
affects the public confidence in the department 
The CSC also determined that "[t]he nature of the policy violations 
adversely affected the public confidence in the Department." (R. 34, |^ 5). This 
satisfies factor (b) set forth in Harmon. Officer Boston states that no evidence was 
presented that "the public at large has ever learned of Officer Boston's alleged 
policy violations." (Boston Brief, p. 23)(Emphasis added). Contrary to Officer 
Boston's assertion, there was evidence that the public was adversely affected. In 
particular, Chief Burbank testified that the victim in the theft case, Mr. Baker, told 
the IA investigators that he would participate in the investigation "as long as 
Officer Boston doesn't come back. I don't want to see Officer Boston again." Mr. 
Baker said this many times. (R.31, pp. 117, 122). This very unhappy citizen 
clearly knew of Officer Boston's misconduct. There also was plenty of evidence 
that Officer Boston's conduct was of the type that could reasonably affect the 
public confidence in the Department. Chief Burbank testified: 
When we go out there our mission is to actually serve the public and 
meet their needs. And when we show up and do not conduct a thorough 
investigation and leave things hanging, we force individuals in our 
community to call the police back. 
That goes to our organizational integrity and breaks it down. And if 
the public does not have trust for the police department in order to handle 
things accurately and effectively, then it breaks down not only for that 
individual officer that responded, but for the entire organization, and it 
jeopardizes our reputation with the public. 
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And when you consider public trust and how fragile that is, it's 
something that we safeguard as one of the most important things as a police 
department that we can hold onto and value. . . (R.31, p. 121). 
And when our officers show up on things and file to do the bare 
minimum for the investigations, it leaves the public with a very sour taste 
that goes directly to our credibility with the public. And if we don't have 
the public trust in the police department and our ability to do business, then 
we really are unable to accomplish anything, and it undermines our ability 
to testify in court, to testify in proceedings such as this as to facts and 
everything else. (R.31, p. 138). 
The CSC had before it sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the 
second Harmon factor had been met. 
3. Harmon factor (c): whether the offense undermines the morale and 
effectiveness of the department 
Officer Boston again concludes that there was no evidence that her alleged 
policy violations negatively affected the Department's morale and effectiveness. 
Chief Burbank testified that allowing an officer to function at less than the 
standards of the SLCPD could certainly affect morale. (R.31, p. 145). He also 
stated that "it also undermines the effectiveness of the administration if we don't 
take appropriate action to deal with employees that are committing pretty blatant 
violations of our policy and procedure, as well as undermining public trust. I 
mean, that's something that officers hold in high regard." (R.31, p. 145). As a 
result of Officer Boston's conduct during the theft incident, it was necessary for 
another police officer to respond and, according to Chief Burbank, "clean up the 
mess" Officer Boston had made. (R.31, p. 117). That officer felt compelled to 
bring the situation to the attention of the sergeant. (R.31, p. 117). 
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One of Officer Boston's own witnesses, Sergeant Mike Hill, testified that 
he had to try to work out some morale issues with his squad and was trying to help 
Officer Boston through those issues as well. (R.31, p. 233). Sgt. Hill testified that 
Officer Boston "took shortcuts" and that he told her "[y]ou just can't take the 
shortcut. I mean, when you do all these good things, but then you take a shortcut 
and it kind of puts a kibosh on some of the good things that you're doing here." 
(R.31, p. 236). 
There was sufficient evidence to support the CSC's conclusion that "the 
nature of the policy violations undermined the morale and effectiveness of the 
Department. (R. 34, f^ 6). This satisfies factor (c) set forth in Harmon. 
4. Harmon factor (d): whether the offense was committed willfully or 
knowingly, rather than negligently or inadvertently. 
Although the Commission found that Boston did not willfully violate 
Department policy R. 34, <[} 14), there was substantial evidence presented that she 
had knowledge of the policies and had received discipline in the past for violating 
the same policies. (R. 31, p. 304). Officer Boston had "developed a consistent 
pattern of neglect of duty, not servicing the public." (R. 31, p. 129). Chief 
Burbank characterized her conduct as: "In one case she says, CI understand that I 
generate a report on every single thing, almost to an extreme. And I will always 
contact the supervisor.' But none of that seemed to take effect. So it's a repeated 
offense over and over again. (R. 31, pp.l29-130)(Emphasis added). Also, Officer 
Boston had been warned on two prior occasions that future violations of 
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Department policy could result in her termination. (R. 17, p. 371: R. 18, p. 672; R. 
31, p. 26). 
There was sufficient evidence that Officer Boston knowingly violated the 
same policies she had violated in the past, thus satisfying factor (d) set forth in 
Harmon. 
5. Additional considerations: whether the misconduct is likely to 
reoccur. 
In his letter of termination, Chief Burbank stated: 'These two new 
sustained complaints are significant in their own right but, when coupled with 
your complaint history, they reflect a pattern of continued inability to perform the 
basic functions of a police officer. I am convinced that this trend will only 
continue and I have lost all trust and confidence in your ability \o meet the many 
demands that are placed on a police officer." (R. 4)(Emphasis added). He also 
testified that "there's no question in my mind that she had been afforded ample 
opportunity to change her behavior and did not do so." (R. 31, p. 144). 
This Court should uphold the CSC's decision because it was both 
reasonable and rational for the CSC to determine that termination was the 
appropriate sanction in Officer Boston's case. 
C. The Discipline Was Consistent 
Officer Boston challenges as being "clearly erroneous" the CSC's finding 
that "Officer Boston offered no evidence of disparate treatment." (R. 33, ^ | 3). 
Officer Boston asserts that she had, in fact, made a prima facie case of disparate 
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treatment. It appears that Officer Boston misapprehends the burden of proof she 
had to shoulder at the CSC hearing. 
It is well recognized that burden is "on [Boston] to establish a prima facie 
case that the Chief acted inconsistently in imposing sanctions by presenting 
sufficient evidence from which the Commission could reasonably find a relevant 
inconsistency." Kelly, 8 P.3d at 1056. It is the burden of the disciplined employee 
to point to "specific instances or statistics, rather than relying on an unsupported 
assertion of inconsistent punishments " Id. (Emphasis added). A showing must be 
made of "some meaningful disparity of treatment between herself and other 
similarly situated employees." Id. This Court has instructed that "[mjeaningful 
disparate treatment can only be found when similar factual circumstances led to a 
different result without explanation" Id. (Emphasis added). Contrary to Officer 
Boston's assertions, it is not the Department's burden of persuasion to prove the 
"nonexistence of a disparity." Id. (Emphasis added). At all times, the burden 
remained with Officer Boston. 
Officer Boston challenges the CSC's finding that "Police Chief Chris 
Burbank testified of several other similarly situated officers who were treated in a 
similar manner to Boston." (R. 33, ^ j 4). Again, rather than challenging the 
finding of fact by marshalling all of the evidence in support of that fact, Officer 
Boston simply states that the Department "identified no documentation," choosing 
to rely instead on Chief Burbank's testimony as the "only evidence." (Boston 
Brief, p. 29). Interestingly, Officer Boston, who bears the burden of proving 
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disparate treatment, likewise offered no documentation, choosing not to produce 
. . . 7 
any records she obtained through discovery on prior Department discipline. 
Instead, she relied on her own "opinion" that she had been treated differently. (R. 
31, p. 292). 
Officer Boston believes that her "opinion" that she was treated differently 
is, in itself, enough to make a prima facie case of disparate treatment. However, 
much more is needed in order for her to meet her burden of proof. The evidence 
that the CSC had before it includes: 
a. Chief Burbank testified of a sergeant who received a $20.00 bill that 
was found property but did not place that $20.00 into evidence. That sergeant 
really had no other complaints in his history. (R. 31, p. 146). 
b. An officer who had been with the Department for 16 years had a 
"similar story of circumstances where he was not documenting his police actions." 
(R.31, p. 147). Although he did "some outstanding work" and the Chief "really 
hated to lose" him, "when it came down to it, he did not document accurately 
domestic violence incidents, didn't file the proper paperwork associated with that, 
and he really put the public at risk." (R.31, p. 147). 
7
 Officer Boston refers to documents SLC 954-1126 that she received in 
discovery. Of those documents, SLC 987 - 1126 were NOT admitted as exhibits 
nor were they presented to the Commission. Officer Boston's attorney specifically 
stated that he was "not trying to put them before the Commission" and that they 
were "not intending to admit them." (R. 31, pp. 293-294). Officer Boston's 
attempts to draw inferences from or otherwise use those documents now for the 
first time on appeal should be rejected. 
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c. Chief Burbank made the decision to terminate both of the above 
individuals but both resigned in lieu of termination. (R.31, pp. 147-148). 
d. Chief Burbank testified of a sergeant who, on a DUI call, chose to 
destroy evidence and not process the person for DUI. (R.31, p. 148). The 
sergeant had no prior disciplinary history but Chief Burbank imposed a 60-hour 
suspension without pay for this first sustained misconduct. (R.31, pp. 149-150). 
Another complaint came in against this sergeant in close proximity and Chief 
Burbank placed him on administrative leave. (R.31, p. 150). The sergeant 
resigned while that investigation was pending. (R.31, p. 150). 
e. Commissioner Quintana asked Chief Burbank: "So you've lost 
some fairly good officers and some outstanding officers to misconduct?" To 
which Chief Burbank responded, "Yeah. And it's unfortunate. But I think for, 
again, the departmental integrity that it's essential." (R.31, p. 149). 
Officer Boston made no effort to marshal the facts in support of 
consistency. Rather, in her Brief, she makes conclusory statements that fail to 
even reflect the totality of her own testimony. For instance: Officer Boston points 
to one officer who had improperly handled a DUI investigation, concluding that he 
"had been disciplined with 60 hours of unpaid suspension and ordered to take 
additional DUI training." (Boston Brief, p. 26). She ignores Chief Burbank's 
testimony about this incident (supra), including the fact that this individual had no 
prior disciplinary history when he was given the 60-hour suspension, a fact she 
admitted at the hearing but did not mention in her Brief. (R. 31, p. 302). Officer 
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Boston also fails to point this Court to her admission during the CSC hearing that 
the person who received the 60-hour suspension had no formal disciplinary history 
prior to his suspension whereas Officer Boston had a written reprimand, a 40-hour 
suspension and an 80-hour suspension prior to being terminated for misconduct. 
(R.31, pp. 301-302). 
In her Brief, Officer Boston also points to "T.S" who was employed by the 
Department for a period of time similar to Officer Boston. Although Officer 
Boston never mentioned this case during the CSC hearing and her counsel never 
questioned Chief Burbank about it, she nevertheless points to this matter as one 
that established her prima facie case. She indicates that T.S. had received six 
warnings for various policy violations prior to being terminated for inappropriate 
use of communication systems and sexual harassment. (Boston Brief, p. 28). 
Officer Boston concludes that T.S. had a "substantial prior history of perfomiance 
deficits" but, once again, is completely silent as to her own substantial prior 
history of perfomiance deficits that was presented to the CSC and which Chief 
Burbank testified that he could not ignore. (Boston Brief, p. 28; R.31, p. 141). 
She also fails to point out that it was Chief Dinse, not Chief Burbank, who made 
the decision to terminate T.S's employment. 
She also points to Officer Greer who was terminated for three incidents of 
misconduct. Her only effort to distinguish this case from hers is to cite to this 
Court's unpublished opinion, Greer v Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm 7z, 2007 
UT App 293, 2007 WL 2566280, and offer the conclusion that Officer Greer was 
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terminated for "overtly improper and hostile conduct" whereas Officer Boston's 
"errors were of omission, not affirmative misconduct." (Boston Brief, p. 28). 
Such a characterization completely ignores all of the evidence the CSC received 
concerning Officer Boston's behavior in both the collision/DUI incident and the 
theft incident. 
Officer Boston apparently believes that Chief Burbank's testimony about 
other officers he has disciplined constitutes mere "generalities" when compared to 
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Officer Boston's "assessment of several cases." (Boston Brief, p. 31). Such a 
statement is entirely contrary to the well-established law that the "Chief must have 
the ability to manage and direct his officers, and is in the best position to know 
whether their actions merit discipline. " Kelly, 8 p. 3d at 1054, (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the argument fails to recognize that the CSC "is required to give 
deference to the Chief, as he is able to 'balance the competing concerns in 
pursuing a particular disciplinary action.'" Harmon, 171 P.3d at 476. Officer 
Boston's attacks on the CSC's finding of fact that "Officer Boston offered no 
evidence of disparate treatment" (R. 33, ^ f 3) should be rejected because she has 
failed (1) to sustain her burden of marshaling the evidence, (2) to carry her burden 
of showing some meaningful disparity of treatment between herself and other 
Department employees, and (3) to establish a prima facie showing that Chief 
It should be noted that Officer Boston's counsel never cross-examined Chief 
Burbank about his discipline of any other officer nor did he question Chief 
Burbank about any perceived "generalities. 
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Burbank's actions were contrary to his prior practice. (See, e.g. Kelly, 8 p. 3d at 
1055). 
CONCLUSION 
Chief Burbank properly determined that termination was the appropriate 
discipline to impose based upon Officer Boston's misconduct. The CSC reviewed 
all of the evidence, reached factual findings based upon the evidence presented to 
it and properly concluded that Chief Burbank's decision was appropriate. Officer 
Boston has failed to demonstrate Chief Burbank's decision was factually or legally 
incorrect. This Court should determine, as it did in Kelly, that the "Commission 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Chiefs decision to terminate 
[Boston] was proportionate to the offense when viewed in light of her entire 
record with the Department, specifically recognizing that the chief had given her 
many opportunities to correct her behavior and had engaged in progressive 
discipline." Kelly, 8 p.3d at 1057. 
The City respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the CSC's 
ruling upholding the Chiefs decision to terminate Officer Boston. 
Dated this 24th day of September, 2008. 
IARTHA 
Senior City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
41 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of September, 2008,1 caused to be 
hand delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION to the following attorneys 
for Petitioner/Appellant Stephanie Boston: 
GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
Skordas, Caston & Hyde, LLC 
341 South Main, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Epperson, Rencher & Owens 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
42 
